Captain Nils N. French, '', The Canadian Army Journal, Volume 10 Number 4, Winter 2008

EXCERPT: "In the final days of 1979, the Soviet Union, under the direction of the Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, invaded Afghanistan. Soviet Special Forces and KGB agents assaulted Tajbeg Palace and executed President Hafizullah Amin the evening of December 27th as Soviet ground forces started their entry across the northern border. Brezhnev had decided to intervene when it became clear that Soviet advisory and aviation support to the threatened Afghan government was insufficient. Recent governments had attempted to reform the country too rapidly, making Afghanistan vulnerable to an Islamic overthrow similar to that of Iran. This, combined with numerous other reasons, led Moscow to its decision. Soviet forces faced an immense challenge. It was presented with not only the vast and rough terrain of Afghanistan, but also by its xenophobic Islamic population, which at the time was in a state of civil war. Fighting from ambush sites inherited from their ancestors and aided by men and material from around the world, the Afghan mujahideen fought a protracted insurgency against the Soviets. Although Soviet military forces completed every military task they were assigned, the tactical victories combined to result in strategic failure. Analysis through the lens of an appropriate model clearly demonstrates why."

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