While May concluded with the reporting of extraordinary levels of conflict related activity (surpassing the previous peak recorded in August 2010), the opening period for June indicates a continuation of this momentum, reporting similarly high levels of incidents (see p. 7). This periods figures also reveal that despite security force efforts at interdiction and disruption of AOG networks (both manpower and supply related) through the winter and into early 2011, armed opposition elements are far from being a spent force, and in fact appear more than capable of continuing their efforts unabated. Early June generally serves as a reliable indicator for pending levels of violence and marks a stage in the steady upwards trend leading into the later summer months, though this may be affected by the early onset of Ramadan this year (August). component of the opposition campaign plan (as indicated by the graphs on p. 10) and serve as one of the key tactics driving present growth. Suicide attack levels remain relatively steady, and the use of indirect fire methods continue to be a regular feature of the conflict landscape. From a str a t e g i c perspective, there is little significant month to month change in the geographic distribution of incidents, though periodic ‘hills and valleys’ do occur in various areas, the result of both intentional planning and forced circumstance on both sides. This period Logar, Paktya and Herat marked significant monthly volume increases for AOG attributed events, and f o l l owi n g per i o d i c fluctuations in an otherwise meteoric rise, AOG activity levels in Helmand are once again on the upswing.